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hy government and non-
governmental policies and projects 
fail despite 'evaluations,' asks David H. 
Lempert in the Journal of 
MultiDisciplinary Evaluation (2010) and 
then puts forth a stinging critique of 
evaluation practice in public 
organizations. While Mr. Lempert has 
many good insights and makes a number 
of interesting and valid points, there 
seems to be some fundamental 
misunderstandings about what 
independence means in evaluation and 
the role of evaluation in oversight. 
As he uses the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 
evaluation function as a case example, I 
feel compelled to respond to some of the 
points, which indicate a lack of 
understanding of the evaluation 
architecture in the organization. My 
purpose is not to defend UNDP, which 
indeed does face a number of challenges 
related to monitoring and evaluation. 
Rather, I will focus on clarifying some 
misconceptions about the organization of 
the evaluation function in UNDP, while 
making some broader points about 
evaluation in public sector organizations. 
Lempert’s article contains a number of 
valuable observations regarding the 
prerequisites of effective evaluation. 
These start from the design of programs 
and results frameworks that either are or 
are not evaluable. When goals, outcomes 
and outputs have not been clearly defined 
or when data and information on progress 
are not collected, evaluation is difficult, to 
say the least. On the other side there are 
the internal requirements for an effective 
evaluation function. Lempert’s indicators 
overlap to a large extent with the norms of 
the United Nations Evaluation Group 
(UNEG), a professional network of 
evaluation units in the UN system, which 
include independence, intentionality, 
transparency, ethics, impartiality, quality, 
timeliness and utility.1 The UNDP 
evaluation policy builds upon these 
principles as well. 
Mr. Lempert’s premise is, rightly, that 
the performance of organizations should 
ultimately be judged by how well their 
programs, products and services serve the 
people who are intended to benefit from 
them. I do however disagree with his basic 
assumption that public organizations (and 
                                                
1 http://www.unevaluation.org 
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indeed NGOs and even private 
foundations that are not based on a profit 
motive) behave somehow less accountably 
than private companies. Competitiveness 
of private firms is ultimately tested by 
their profits and market shares, but this 
can hardly be compared with evaluation, 
per se, as Lempert seems to suggest. As he 
himself points out (p. 91), private firms 
judge their own success only by the above 
criteria, while their entire business model 
may be mostly detrimental to human 
wellbeing. Such social concerns—or 
“external harms” (p. 91) they may cause to 
public interest—do not often feature in 
their ‘evaluations.’ 
I fully agree that UN agencies should 
be evaluated against their performance in 
promoting development that underlies 
their policies and operations in countries 
that have ratified relevant international 
conventions and agreements. Again, the 
ultimate stakeholders are the citizens of 
the developing countries, which UNDP 
and other UN agencies are set out to 
support. Therefore, such ‘downward 
accountability’ to the intended 
beneficiaries must form the basis for 
evaluation. The proof of the pudding must 
be whether the lives of the people are 
improved and whether the work of the UN 
agencies partnering with their 
governments and others has contributed 
to such improvements. 
As an intergovernmental organization 
set up under the Economic and Social 
Commission of the UN, UNDP works 
primarily through governments and its 
Executive Board consists of government 
representatives from both donor and 
program countries. The direct 
accountability of UNDP for achieving 
results is in the first instance to the 
Executive Board, as its governing body, 
but UNDP is also accountable to the 
program country governments and 
citizens where the organization works. 
And as a public organization, it also has a 
broader accountability to the public. 
Having stated this ideal situation, I 
recognize the specific challenges that face 
international organizations that are 
operating somewhat removed from direct 
control by any single democratic system. 
For this purpose, evaluation serves a 
particularly important role. In UNDP, the 
Executive Board has significantly 
strengthened its oversight role and 
supported the strengthening of the 
evaluation function over the past few 
years. The evaluation policy approved by 
the Executive Board in 2006, which 
Lempert scrutinizes in his paper, was an 
important step into this direction. In 
2009, there was an independent review of 
the policy the findings of which were 
presented to the Executive Board in June 
2010 (Gariba et al., 2010). The review 
found that while the policy by and large 
was relevant, its implementation left room 
for improvement. 
The UNDP evaluation policy (UNDP, 
2006), defines the organization’s 
evaluation function as follows:2 
 
Evaluation in UNDP will provide an 
objective assessment of contributions to 
development results, through assessing its 
programmes and operations, including 
advocacy, advisory services, knowledge 
networks, technical assistance, 
coordination and partnerships. Evaluation 
will address what works and why, as well 
as what does not work and unintended 
outcomes. This will support 
accountability, inform decision-making 
and allow UNDP to better manage for 
development results. 
 
Lempert criticizes the policy for not 
providing a definition of the mission of 
                                                
2 All UNDP evaluation documents are publicly 
available at http://www.undp.org/evaluation.  
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the Evaluation Office in terms of 
sustainable human development as 
defined in treaties, such as the UN 
Conference on Environment and 
Development or the 1992 Rio Declaration 
(p. 98). This is strictly correct, especially 
as the two instances mentioned above do 
not form the basis of UNDP’s mandate. 
These conventions evolve over time and 
are part of the normative architecture of 
the UN. Therefore, the principles 
embodied in organizational structures, 
like that of UNDP, are more fundamental. 
However, we do take specific conventions 
into account in relevant evaluations. For 
example, the recent evaluation of UNDP’s 
role and contributions in environment 
and energy did refer to the above 
mentioned environmental agreements 
(EO, 2008). 
Furthermore, the evaluation policy is 
not intended as a standalone document 
and is complementary to other UNDP 
policy statements. At the same time, the 
evaluation policy does outline the 
principles that underlie evaluation in the 
organization, namely human development 
and human rights, UN system 
coordination, national ownership, and 
managing for results (UNDP, 2006). 
I fully agree with Lempert that 
protecting the professionalism and 
objectivity of the evaluators is essential (p. 
71). He goes on to identify factors that are 
important in this respect, including 
looking at the evaluator’s work in its 
entirety and having safeguards against 
undue interference at every step from 
hiring to firing. This is indeed valuable 
insight. 
It is worth noting that the evaluation 
architecture in UNDP consists of two 
distinct and complementary parts, a 
distinction that appears to elude Mr. 
Lempert. On the one hand, there is the 
independent evaluation function as 
practiced by the central Evaluation Office 
reporting directly to the Executive Board.  
On the other, in the highly decentralized 
organization operating on the ground in 
166 countries, the evaluation function has 
also been decentralized. Most of the 
evaluations are commissioned by the 
country offices and other program units in 
the organization. Like UNDP, many 
development organizations (including 
other UN agencies, like UNICEF, as well 
as bilateral donors such as USAID and 
DFID) that have country-level presence 
rely on decentralized evaluations (some 
call them self-evaluations). Their role is 
primarily not for accountability, but 
helping program managers and decision-
makers on the ground to manage better 
for development results. Such 
decentralized evaluations also form 
building blocks for independent 
evaluations that have a greater emphasis 
on accountability. 
While these evaluations are carried out 
by outside consultants, they are not 
considered to be independent because 
they are indeed commissioned by the very 
units whose performance they are 
evaluating. It is my understanding that 
Mr. Lempert himself has in the past 
undertaken such consultancy assignments 
for certain UNDP country offices. 
Frustrations caused by them may in part 
explain the livid tone in his article. Such 
frustrations are understandable, as the 
decentralized evaluation system still 
leaves much to be desired, as has been 
identified in both the independent review 
mentioned above as well as analyses 
carried out by the Evaluation Office 
(Gariba et al., 2010; EO, 2010). Both the 
coverage as well as the quality of the 
decentralized evaluations has been found 
to be deficient. Both UNDP management 
and the Executive Board are well aware of 
these problems and steps are being taken 
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to enhance the compliance with 
evaluation policy and to strengthen the 
decentralized evaluation system. While 
the decentralized evaluations will not 
become independent evaluations, they can 
still play an important role in program 
oversight and, in particular, improvement 
of programming and implementation by 
feeding in lessons about what has worked 
and what has not. 
As for the independent evaluation 
function, this rests with the Evaluation 
Office whose independence has been 
established through both structural and 
administrative processes. However, it is 
worth noting that the above mentioned 
independent review (Gariba et al, 2010) 
highlighted the same observation as 
Lempert (p. 98) that the evaluation policy 
is not explicit in protecting the 
independence of the Evaluation Office. 
This omission will be rectified in a 
revision of the evaluation policy that will 
be presented to the Executive Board in 
January 2011. 
The director of the Evaluation Office is 
appointed by UNDP’s administrator in 
consultation with the Executive Board and 
her/his service is limited to a maximum of 
two four-year terms after which she/he 
cannot return to any other function in 
UNDP. The director is in charge of 
recruitment of staff into the office. She/he 
also has full authority to propose a 
program of work for independent 
evaluation to the Executive Board for 
approval, reflecting both the need for 
accountability for results and ensuring 
that the organization is strategically 
positioned vis-à-vis the defined 
development priorities, its own 
comparative advantages, and other 
partners. The director also decides on the 
scope, conduct and disclosure of 
evaluations. The evaluations submitted to 
the Executive Board are considered 
reports by the Evaluation Office, not of 
individual consultants. For these reasons, 
the Evaluation Office is responsible for 
the quality of the evaluations. 
While the Evaluation Office director 
and staff are UNDP employees and 
located inside of the organization, it is a 
complete misunderstanding that the lack 
of independence of the evaluation 
function is proven by the fact that the 
reports produced by the Evaluation Office 
go out under the signature of the director 
and that each of the evaluations lists the 
name of the task manager from the office. 
It is a misunderstanding, because the 
office itself is an independent unit solely 
responsible for the quality and credibility 
of the evaluations. None of the reports are 
submitted to UNDP management for 
vetting or clearance before they are made 
available to the Executive Board and to 
the general public. 
Of course, one could argue, as Lempert 
seems to, that evaluations should be 
carried out by complete outsiders who 
have nothing to do with the organization, 
program, policy or whatever the evaluand 
may be. However, evaluators too far 
removed from the field may not have the 
needed knowledge and insights into the 
area, which would make their learning 
curve very steep. It is furthermore difficult 
to understand who would commission 
such evaluations and how their results 
would be fed back into organizational 
decision-making. If the focus is on 
utilization of evaluation, this would be 
counterproductive. Naturally, outside 
researchers, journalists and others are 
free to study, say, UNDP programs and 
feed their findings back to their own 
audiences, but these would not be 
considered evaluations. 
More important than formal 
independence, I would argue, is the 
credibility of the evaluation. Such 
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credibility is based several factors of 
which independence is but one. Others 
include the quantity and quality of 
evaluative evidence, the methodological 
rigor of the evaluation and, importantly, 
the professional skills of the evaluators. 
Like Lempert indicates (p. 74), the objects 
of evaluation in international 
development are complex and involve 
intricate linkages between multiple factors 
and sectors. Therefore they are usually 
beyond single individuals and require 
teams that encompass various types of 
expertise. Normally, UNDP Evaluation 
Office evaluations are conducted by teams 
consisting of four to up to a dozen staff 
and consultants with necessary expertise, 
not only in the relevant subject matter(s) 
but also in evaluation. Also, for the sake of 
objectivity, in selecting our teams we vet 
the consultants carefully to ensure that 
hey have no conflict of interest, through 
having been involved in the development 
or implementation of the initiatives that 
will be evaluated or expectations of 
employment with the unit that is being 
evaluated. 
From a methodological point of view, 
the Evaluation Office has constantly 
worked on improving its guidance on 
methods adapting both quantitative and 
qualitative evaluation methods to the 
types of evaluations that it conducts.3 The 
office also provides guidance to other 
units in the organization who commission 
evaluations (UNDP, 2009). 
With regard to the UNEG norms, I’ve 
already discussed independence and 
credibility above. In addition, I would like 
to highlight two other norms, namely 
intentionality and transparency. 
Intentionality refers to being clear why an 
evaluation is carried out and what it is 
                                                
3 http://www.undp.org/evaluation/ 
methodologies.htm 
expected to contribute to. Evaluation 
should not be a goal in itself and should 
not pose undue burden on those 
responsible for the evaluand. Instead, it is 
important to define clearly whether the 
evaluation would contribute to a 
particular cause, be it accountability for 
results achieved to benefit the intended 
benefits, effective use of resources, 
program improvement or learning from 
the past for future operations. 
Transparency is also important, both 
in planning and conduct of evaluations, as 
well as sharing their results and what will 
be done about them. For the purpose of 
transparency, the UNDP Executive Board 
has decided that all evaluations produced 
by UNDP—be they independent or 
commissioned by program units—and the 
management responses thereto are public 
documents available to all and every 
organization or individual. The public 
website, Evaluation Resources Center,4 
contains all evaluation reports and 
management responses, as well as the 
monitoring system of the implementation 
of the agreed follow-up actions to each of 
the evaluations. This transparency has 
allowed also Mr. Lempert to scrutinize the 
UNDP evaluation-related documents that 
he refers to in his analysis. 
It is true that the management does 
not have to agree with all the conclusions 
and recommendations put forth by an 
evaluation. After all, evaluators are not 
super-humans with absolute knowledge 
and understanding of the evaluand. 
Rather, they make evidence based 
findings and suggestions on how to 
address problems or improve 
performance (or to close down a program, 
change strategy, etc.). The lame 
management responses referred to by 
Lempert surely exist, but I believe that in 
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UNDP’s case they are getting rarer and 
occur mostly in case of the decentralized 
evaluations. It is required that the 
management responses address each of 
the evaluation recommendations and give 
reasons in cases when the management 
does not agree with the recommendation. 
I could give several examples from 
evaluations conducted by the Evaluation 
Office where the Executive Board has 
rejected the management response and 
requested a stronger one to be presented 
in the next session. 
Finally, what is the role of evaluation? 
Lempert seems to lump all oversight 
functions together into one pot under the 
lid of evaluation. Many of the indicators 
and questions proposed seem to be more 
the function of audit or even 
investigations than evaluation (a blatant 
example of such would be Question I.B.3. 
System 3. Cost Accounting and Cost 
Control Systems for Procurement and for 
Personnel—surely this is not an 
evaluation function!). 
Certainly, the role of evaluation is 
neither to make decisions about how a 
policy or program should be changed or 
terminated. Lempert complains (p. 60) 
about cases “where evaluators are not 
empowered to stop or replace projects or 
redesign failing systems, or to hold 
anyone accountable for performance…” 
Under no circumstances can or should the 
evaluator act as the prosecutor, judge, jury 
and executioner all in one. Furthermore, 
getting into “redesigning failing systems” 
would be a direct conflict of interest and 
would undermine the very independence 
of the evaluators. Who would be the 
watchdog to ward against this and who 
would then evaluate what the evaluators 
have created? 
The role of evaluation should be to 
provide objective and credible 
information on the relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and 
performance of the evaluand, be it a 
strategy, policy, program, project, 
organization, unit, etc. Based on evidence, 
solid methods and professional judgment, 
evaluators will give options or propose 
possible solutions to identified issues or 
problems, but it is up to the management 
to decide how to act on such 
recommendations. It is of utmost 
importance that such discussions are 
made in the public domain and that the 
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